Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action
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Other versions of this item:
- Pranab K. Bardhan & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action," Development and Comp Systems 0407003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bardhan, Pranab & Singh, Nirvikar, 2004. "Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt1mg8p7tc, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
References listed on IDEAS
- Licun Xue, 2000. "Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(3), pages 339-357.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Alonso, José Antonio, 2007. "Inequality, institutions and progress: a debate between history and the present," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), December.
More about this item
Keywordsinequality; self-enforcing; collective action; infrastructure;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- P0 - Economic Systems - - General
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