IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bge/wpaper/362.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Leadership in Collective Action

Author

Listed:
  • Joan Esteban
  • Esther Hauk

Abstract

We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specifific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefifits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefifits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size.

Suggested Citation

  • Joan Esteban & Esther Hauk, 2009. "Leadership in Collective Action," Working Papers 362, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:362
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/362.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Moral hazard and free riding in collective action," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(2), pages 197-219, February.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:95:y:2001:i:03:p:663-672_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 366-380, March.
    4. Josep M. Colomer, 1995. "Leadership Games in Collective Action," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(2), pages 225-246, April.
    5. repec:feb:natura:0013 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2005. "Cooperation in collective action," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 13(3), pages 473-498, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    collective contests; Leadership; group platform; Incentives; sharing rules;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:362. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruno Guallar). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/bargses.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.