Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action
In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.
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- Licun Xue, 2000. "Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(3), pages 339-357.
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