IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mtl/montde/2016-02.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Agendas in legislative decision-making

Author

Listed:
  • HORAN, Sean

Abstract

Despite the wide range of agendas used in legislative decision-making, the literature has focused almost exclusively on two stylized formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. As emphasized by Ordeshook and Schwartz [1987], this focus leaves a sizable gap in our understanding of the legislative process. To help address the deficiency, I first define a very broad class of agendas (called simple agendas) whose features are common among agendas used in legislative settings. I then characterize the sophisticated (Farquharson [1969]) voting outcomes implemented by agendas in this class. By establishing a clear connection between the structure of simple agendas and the outcomes associated with them, the characterization extends our understanding of legislative decision-making well beyond the very limited scope of Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas.

Suggested Citation

  • HORAN, Sean, 2016. "Agendas in legislative decision-making," Cahiers de recherche 2016-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2016-02
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/13169
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521428316 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ching, Stephen, 1996. "A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 298-302, October.
    3. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521424585 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Apesteguia, Jose & Ballester, Miguel A. & Masatlioglu, Yusufcan, 2014. "A foundation for strategic agenda voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 91-99.
    5. Michel Le Breton & Peter J. Coughlan, 1999. "A social choice function implementable via backward induction with values in the ultimate uncovered set," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(2), pages 153-160.
    6. COUGHLAN, Peter J. & LE BRETON, Michel, 1999. "A social choice function implementable via backward induction with values in the ultimate uncovered set," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1406, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Peter C. Fishburn, 1974. "Subset Choice Conditions and the Computation of Social Choice Sets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 88(2), pages 320-329.
    8. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
    9. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521417815 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2020. "Agenda-manipulation in ranking," Papers 2001.11341, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
    2. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2023. "Agenda-Manipulation in Ranking," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(4), pages 1865-1892.
    3. Horan, Sean & Sprumont, Yves, 2022. "Two-stage majoritarian choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    4. Pongou, Roland & Tondji, Jean-Baptiste, 2024. "The reciprocity set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2015. "Sequential Voting and Agenda Manipulation: The Case of Forward Looking Tie-Breaking," Working Papers 782, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Dynamic Farsighted Stability," Discussion Papers 22, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "Dynamic stable set," Discussion Papers 33, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    4. Barberà, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2017. "Sequential voting and agenda manipulation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
    5. S. Nageeb Ali & B. Douglas Bernheim & Alexander W. Bloedel & Silvia Console Battilana, 2022. "Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Polity," Papers 2212.01263, arXiv.org.
    6. Lu Hong & Scott Page, 1994. "Reducing informational costs in endowment mechanisms," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 103-117, December.
    7. Barberà, Salvador & Bossert, Walter & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2023. "Wine rankings and the Borda method," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 122-138, May.
    8. Hiroki Saitoh, 2022. "Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 139-173, July.
    9. moldovanu, benny, 2018. "A Nazi †Killer†Amendment," CEPR Discussion Papers 13260, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Kelly, Jerry S. & Qi, Shaofang, 2016. "Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 39-41.
    11. Fritz W. Scharpf, 1991. "Games Real Actors Could Play: The Challenge of Complexity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(3), pages 277-304, July.
    12. John Duggan, 2006. "Endogenous Voting Agendas," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 495-530, December.
    13. Z. Emel Öztürk, 2020. "Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 801-831, September.
    14. Brandl, Florian & Peters, Dominik, 2022. "Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    15. Jackson, Matthew & Moulin, Hervé, 1992. "Implementing a public project and distributing its cost," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 125-140.
    16. Alex Gershkov & Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2019. "The Art of Compromising: Voting with Interdependent Values and the Flag of the Weimar Republic," Working Papers tecipa-645, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    17. Bhaskar Dutta & Matthew O. Jackson & Michel Le Breton, 2004. "Equilibrium agenda formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(1), pages 21-57, August.
    18. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.
    19. Wagner, Alexander K. & Granic, Dura-Georg, 2017. "Tie-Breaking Power in Committees," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168187, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    20. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 1-40, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Majority voting; sophisticated voting; agendas; committees; implementation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2016-02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sharon BREWER (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/demtlca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.