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Agendas in legislative decision-making

Author

Listed:
  • Horan, Sean Michael

    (Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal)

Abstract

Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features, history-independence and persistence, are common in legislative settings. I then characterize the social choice rules implemented by sophisticated voting on agendas with these two features. I also characterize the rules implemented by more specialized formats (called priority agendas and convex agendas) whose structure is closely related to the prevailing rules for order-of-voting used by legislatures. These results establish a clear connection between structure and outcomes for a wide range of legislative agendas.

Suggested Citation

  • Horan, Sean Michael, 2021. "Agendas in legislative decision-making," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(1), January.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:2618
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    Cited by:

    1. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2020. "Agenda-manipulation in ranking," Papers 2001.11341, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
    2. Horan, Sean & Sprumont, Yves, 2022. "Two-stage majoritarian choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    3. Pongou, Roland & Tondji, Jean-Baptiste, 2024. "The reciprocity set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    4. Hans Gersbach & Kremena Valkanova, 2024. "Voting with Random Proposers: Two Rounds May Suffice," Papers 2410.20476, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2025.
    5. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2023. "Agenda-Manipulation in Ranking," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(4), pages 1865-1892.
    6. Hans Gersbach, 2025. "Propose or Vote: A Canonical Democratic Procedure," Papers 2506.05998, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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