Spatial pillage game
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More about this item
KeywordsAllocation by force Coalitional games Pillage game Spatial restriction Stable set Farsighted core;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- R19 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Other
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