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Pillage and property


  • Jordan, J.S.


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Suggested Citation

  • Jordan, J.S., 2006. "Pillage and property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 26-44, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:131:y:2006:i:1:p:26-44

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-739, September.
    2. Usher, Dan, 1989. "The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1031-1044, December.
    3. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    4. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    5. John C. Harsanyi, 1974. "An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(11), pages 1472-1495, July.
    6. Lucas, William F., 1992. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 543-590 Elsevier.
    7. Durham, Yvonne & Hirshleifer, Jack & Smith, Vernon L., 2008. "The Paradox of Power," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Nei, Stephen, 2014. "Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade," Research Papers 3097, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    2. Herbst, Luisa & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2017. "Balance of power and the propensity of conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 168-184.
    3. Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), 2005. "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Working Papers gueconwpa~05-05-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    4. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2009. "Spatial pillage game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(11), pages 701-707, December.
    5. Thomas Gall & Paolo Masella, 2012. "Markets and jungles," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 103-141, June.
    6. Simon MacKenzie & Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2015. "Pillage games with multiple stable sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 993-1013, November.
    7. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2016. "Evolutionary determinants of war," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(4), pages 520-534, August.
    8. Thomas Gall & Paolo Masella, 2007. "A Tale of Markets and Jungles in a Simple Model of Growth," JEPS Working Papers 07-004, JEPS.
    9. Francis Bloch & Anne van den Nouweland, 2017. "Farsighted Stability with Heterogeneous Expectations," Working Papers 2017.31, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    10. Rowat, Colin & Kerber, Manfred, 2014. "Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 69-80.
    11. Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2009. "A Coase Theorem Based on a New Concept of the Core," Staff General Research Papers Archive 13051, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    12. Beardon, Alan F. & Rowat, Colin, 2013. "Efficient sets are small," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 367-374.
    13. Hiller, Timo, 2017. "Friends and enemies: a model of signed network formation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
    14. Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 47, Econometric Society.
    15. J. Jordan, 2009. "Power and efficiency in production pillage games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 171-193, September.
    16. Timo Hiller, 2012. "Friends and Enemies: A Model of Signed Network Formation," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 12/629, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    17. Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2011. "A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(3), pages 461-466, August.
    18. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    19. J.S. Jordan & David Obadia, 2015. "Stable sets in majority pillage games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 473-486, May.
    20. repec:spr:sochwe:v:49:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1057-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0538-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Oren Bar-Gill & Nicola Persico, 2016. "Exchange Efficiency with Weak Ownership Rights," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 230-267, November.

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