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A General Equilibrium Model of Two Group Conflict with Endogenous Intra-group Sharing Rules

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  • Noh, Suk Jae

Abstract

This paper explores the interactions among intragroup sharing rules, the competition between two groups over the common pool of output, and the allocation of resources between productive and appropriate activities. In the interior solution, the use of egalitarian method for the distribution of group income among members plays no distributional role but only affects the allocation of resources. It releases resources into the productive sector from the group that adopts the egalitarian rule by making the internal conflict among the members less intense. The sequential choice of intragroup sharing rules and resource allocations produce the adoption of fully egalitarian intragroup sharing rules in both groups. These rules minimize the amount of resources allocated to appropriate activities and maximize the welfare level of all individuals in the economy. This result suggests that intergroup competition with the use of egalitarian principle in the distribution of group income among group members, which is not available to the Hobbesian state of nature, is one of the cheaper social devices in restraining individuals from engaging in costly appropriative activities. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Noh, Suk Jae, 1999. "A General Equilibrium Model of Two Group Conflict with Endogenous Intra-group Sharing Rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 251-267, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:98:y:1999:i:3-4:p:251-67
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    Cited by:

    1. Pau Balart & Sabine Flamand & Orestis Troumpounis, 2016. "Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 239-262, February.
    2. Hassani-Mahmooei, Behrooz & Parris, Brett W., 2013. "Resource scarcity, effort allocation and environmental security: An agent-based theoretical approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 183-192.
    3. Siqueira, Kevin, 2003. "Participation in organized and unorganized protests and rebellions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 861-874, November.
    4. Noh, Suk Jae, 2002. "Resource distribution and stable alliances with endogenous sharing rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 129-151, March.
    5. Jean-Paul Azam, 2006. "The Paradox of Power Reconsidered: A Theory of Political Regimes in Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 15(1), pages 26-58, March.
    6. Azam, Jean-Paul & Mesnard, Alice, 2003. "Civil War and the Social Contract," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(3-4), pages 455-475, June.
    7. Yang-Ming Chang & Zijun Luo, 2015. "Endogenous division rules as a family constitution: strategic altruistic transfers and sibling competition," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 28(1), pages 173-194, January.
    8. repec:elg:eechap:15325_6 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Pau Balart & Sabine Flamand & Orestis Troumpounis, 2014. "Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests," Working Papers 64402108, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.

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