The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction
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- Juan Carlos Martinez Coll & Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "The Limits of Reciprocity: Solution Concepts and Reactive Strategies in Evolutionary Equilibrium Models," UCLA Economics Working Papers 577, UCLA Department of Economics.
- P. Taylor & L. Jonker, 2010. "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 457, David K. Levine.
- Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-34, November.
- Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. " Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
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