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Intra-Level and Inter-Level Interaction

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  • Kjell Hausken

    (Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Cologne, Germany)

Abstract

This article develops a multi-level framework for modeling rational action in context at any level of abstraction. It first shows how standard n-person collective action problems are affected by the presence and nature of external competition from other groups. The use of public goods produced within a group as means for between-group competition for a prize is shown to help overcome Prisoner's Dilemmas and hence facilitate the emergence of cooperation within groups. It is then shown how interaction on an arbitrary number of levels, with an arbitrary number of actors at each level, radically changes the predicted rational behavior of each individual agent. By assuming groups, and groups embedded in hierarchies, the multi-level model rectifies a number of reductionistically biased results flowing from the conventional single-level one-group model. Accounting for combined intra-level and inter-level interaction is also suggested as a way out of general theoretical dilemmas concerning the connection of micro- and macro-level analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Kjell Hausken, 1995. "Intra-Level and Inter-Level Interaction," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(4), pages 465-488, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:7:y:1995:i:4:p:465-488
    DOI: 10.1177/104346319500700409
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Ortmann & Ralph Hertwig, 2002. "The Costs of Deception: Evidence from Psychology," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(2), pages 111-131, October.
    2. Tverskoi, Denis & Senthilnathan, Athmanathan & Gavrilets, Sergey, 2021. "The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society," SocArXiv 24svr, Center for Open Science.
    3. Hausken, Kjell, 2000. "Cooperation and between-group competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 417-425, July.
    4. Hausken, Kjell, 2000. "Migration and intergroup conflict," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 327-331, December.
    5. Fenling Feng & Chengguang Liu & Jiaqi Zhang, 2020. "China's Railway Transportation Safety Regulation System Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(10), pages 1944-1966, October.
    6. Johannes Münster & Klaas Staal, 2012. "How organizational structure can reduce rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 579-594, March.
    7. Hausken, Kjell, 1998. "Collective rent seeking and division of labor1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 739-768, November.
    8. Gunnthorsdottir, Anna & Rapoport, Amnon, 2006. "Embedding social dilemmas in intergroup competition reduces free-riding," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 184-199, November.
    9. Kjell Hausken & Andreas Ortmann, 2007. "A first experimental test of multilevel game theory: the PD case," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 261-264.

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