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Parallel And Overlapping Games: Theory And An Application To The European Gas Trade

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  • James E. Alt
  • Barry Eichengreen

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  • James E. Alt & Barry Eichengreen, 1989. "Parallel And Overlapping Games: Theory And An Application To The European Gas Trade," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 119-144, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:119-144
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00008.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 259-327, Elsevier.
    2. Ordeshook,Peter C., 1986. "Game Theory and Political Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521315937, October.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(4), pages 541-568.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolò Bellanca & Stefania Innocenti, 2013. "Resistance to Change in Recent Italy: Some Elements for a Theoretical Framework," Working Papers - Economics wp2013_31.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    2. Post, Alison E. & Murillo, María Victoria, 2016. "How Investor Portfolios Shape Regulatory Outcomes: Privatized Infrastructure After Crises," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 328-345.
    3. Barry Eichengreen., 1993. "International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C93-021, University of California at Berkeley.
    4. Jacob D. Petersen-Perlman & Itay Fischhendler, 2018. "The weakness of the strong: re-examining power in transboundary water dynamics," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 275-294, April.
    5. Paul W. Thurner & Eric Linhart, 2004. "Political Multilevel Negotiations and Issue Linkage During an EU Intergovernmental Conference: An Empirical Application," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 243-266, November.
    6. Susanne Lohmann, 1997. "Linkage Politics," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 38-67, February.
    7. Kjell Hausken, 1995. "Intra-Level and Inter-Level Interaction," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(4), pages 465-488, October.
    8. Fischhendler, Itay & Herman, Lior & Anderman, Jaya, 2016. "The geopolitics of cross-border electricity grids: The Israeli-Arab case," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 533-543.
    9. Itay Fischhendler & Eran Feitelson & David Eaton, 2004. "The Short-Term and Long-Term Ramifications of Linkages Involving Natural Resources: The US – Mexico Transboundary Water Case," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 22(5), pages 633-650, October.

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