Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview
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Other versions of this item:
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 259-327 Elsevier.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview," Working papers 445, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew, 1986. "Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9j39n20f, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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- Fluet, Claude & Garella, Paolo G., 2002.
"Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 907-930, September.
- Claude Fluet & Paolo G. Garella, 1999. "Advertising and Prices as Signals of Quality in a Regime of Price Rivalry," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9903, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Deodhar, Satish Y. & Sheldon, Ian M., 1996. "Estimation Of Imperfect Competition In Food Marketing: A Dynamic Analysis Of The German Banana Market," Journal of Food Distribution Research, Food Distribution Research Society, vol. 27(3), pages 1-10, October.
- Pierre-Pascal Gendron, 1996. "Corporation Tax Asymmetries: An Oligopolistic Supergame Analysis," Working Papers ecpap-96-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- T. Ramamohan Rao, 1992. "Efficiency and equity in dynamic principal-agent problems," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 17-41, February.
- Ernst ten Heuvelhof & Martijn Leijten, 2013. "New Public Management and the new features of strategic behaviour," Chapters,in: International Handbook on Mega-Projects, chapter 6, pages 111-130 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Charles F. Mason & Owen R. Phillips, 2016.
"Imminent Entry and the Transition to Multimarket Rivalry in a Laboratory Setting,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 1018-1039, December.
- Charles F. Mason & Owen R. Phillips, 2016. "Imminent Entry and the Transition to Multimarket Rivalry in a Laboratory Setting," CESifo Working Paper Series 5853, CESifo Group Munich.
- Mason, Charles F. & Phillips, Owen R., 2016. "Imminent entry and the transition to multimarket rivalry in a laboratory setting," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68888, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- repec:eee:ejores:v:261:y:2017:i:2:p:755-771 is not listed on IDEAS
- James E. Alt & Barry Eichengreen, 1989. "Parallel And Overlapping Games: Theory And An Application To The European Gas Trade," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 119-144, July.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2005:i:15:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
- Sijm, Jos & Chen, Yihsu & Hobbs, Benjamin F., 2012. "The impact of power market structure on CO2 cost pass-through to electricity prices under quantity competition – A theoretical approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 1143-1152.
- Manfred Stadler, 1992. "Determinants of innovative activity in oligopolistic markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 137-156, June.
- Mason, Charles F. & Phillips, Owen R., 2000. "Vertical integration and collusive incentives: an experimental analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 471-496, April.
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