Medical errors: Mandatory reporting, voluntary reporting, or both?
This work evaluates policy recommendations on medical error reporting systems presented in, To err is human, a report published by the Institute of Medicine. Here mandatory reporting should be applied for adverse events, while voluntary reporting is recommended for near misses. This analysis shows that an error reporting scheme of this type is not an optimal one since both near misses and adverse events may remain unreported. This work makes evident that penalising health care decision makers for not reporting errors, independent of error category, is crucial for reaching the first-best solution.
|Date of creation:||14 Jun 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: HERO / Institute of Health Management and Health Economics P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Sloan, Frank A, 1990. "Experience Rating: Does It Make Sense for Medical Malpractice Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 128-133, May.
- Danzon, Patricia M., 2000.
"Liability for medical malpractice,"
Handbook of Health Economics,in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 26, pages 1339-1404
- Patricia M. Danzon, 1991. "Liability for Medical Malpractice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 51-69, Summer.
- Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June.
- Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1991. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," NBER Working Papers 3822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marilyn J. Simon, 1982. "Diagnoses and Medical Malpractice: A Comparison of Negligence and Strict Liability Systems," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 170-180, Spring. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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