IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/oslohe/2003_010.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Medical errors: Getting the incentives right

Author

Listed:
  • Grepperud, Sverre

    () (Institute of Health Management and Health Economics)

Abstract

This work examines the role of penalties as providers of incentives to prevent medical errors and ensure that such incidents, once they occur, become common knowledge. It is shown that a scheme with two penalties (accountability and non-report) is able to induce the first-best solution. However, this scheme needs not imply a punitive environment, but may, under given circumstances, yield insignificant and even negative penalties. Alternative incentive systems, such as voluntary reporting and legal immunity, are found to have less desirable properties. An exception is the principle of confidentiality (anonymity) which turns out to be an optimal scheme. It is also shown that when a judicial upper limit is binding, for the non-report penalty, it becomes rationale to go “soft” on the accountability penalty.

Suggested Citation

  • Grepperud, Sverre, 2009. "Medical errors: Getting the incentives right," HERO On line Working Paper Series 2003:10, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2003_010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.hero.uio.no/publicat/2003/HERO2003_10.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May.
    2. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark McClellan, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," NBER Working Papers 5466, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Kessler, Daniel & McClellan, Mark, 2002. "Malpractice law and health care reform: optimal liability policy in an era of managed care," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 175-197, May.
    5. Danzon, Patricia M., 2000. "Liability for medical malpractice," Handbook of Health Economics,in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 26, pages 1339-1404 Elsevier.
    6. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
    7. Lewin, Jeff L. & Trumbull, William N., 1990. "The social value of crime?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 271-284, December.
    8. Danzon, Patricia M & Pauly, Mark V & Kington, Raynard S, 1990. "The Effects of Malpractice Litigation on Physicians' Fees and Incomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 122-127, May.
    9. Heyes, Anthony G., 1996. "Cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 251-265, May.
    10. Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(2), pages 353-390.
    11. Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
    12. James Thornton, 1999. "The impact of medical malpractice insurance cost on physician behaviour: the role of income and tort signal effects," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(7), pages 779-794.
    13. Dubay, Lisa & Kaestner, Robert & Waidmann, Timothy, 1999. "The impact of malpractice fears on cesarean section rates," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 491-522, August.
    14. Frank A. Sloan & Lindsey M. Chepke, 2008. "Medical Malpractice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262195720, January.
    15. Jensen, Gail A. & Spurr, Stephen J. & Weycker, Derek A. & Bulycheva, Maria, 1999. "Physicians and the risk of medical malpractice: The role of prior litigation in predicting the future," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 267-289.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Iatrogenic injury; adverse events; reporting incentives; confidentiality;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2003_010. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anbjørg Kolaas). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/heuiono.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.