Collective penalties and inducement of self-reporting
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- Katrin Millock & David Zilberman, 2006. "Collective penalities and inducement of self-reporting," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v06048a, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Marc Willinger & Nasreddine Ammar & Ahmed Ennasri, 2014.
"Performance of the Ambient Tax: Does the Nature of the Damage Matter?,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 59(3), pages 479-502, November.
- Nasreddine AMMAR & Ahmed ENNASRI & Marc Willinger, 2011. "Performance of the ambient tax: does the nature of the damage matter?," Working Papers 11-25, LAMETA, Universitiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2011.
- Etienne, Julien, 2010. "Self-reporting untoward events to external controllers: accounting for reporting failure by a top tier chemical plant," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 36546, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
More about this item
Keywordsself-reporting; Ambient tax; collective penalties; enforcement; self-reporting.;
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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