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Self-Policing and Optimal Law Enforcement When Violator Remediation is Valuable

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  • Robert Innes

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  • Robert Innes, 1999. "Self-Policing and Optimal Law Enforcement When Violator Remediation is Valuable," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1305-1325, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:107:y:1999:i:6:p:1305-1325
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1992. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 133-148, April.
    2. Grady, Mark F, 1988. "Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior: Railroad Sparks and the Farmer," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, pages 15-42.
    3. Oates, Wallace E, 1983. "The Regulation of Externalities: Efficient Behavior by Sources and Victims," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 38(3), pages 362-375.
    4. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Kaplow, Louis, 1992. "Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, pages 365-370.
    5. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Sullivan, Arthur M., 1986. "Liability rules for toxics cleanup," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, pages 191-204.
    7. Epple, Dennis & Visscher, Michael, 1984. "Environmental Pollution: Modeling Occurrence, Detection, and Deterrence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 29-60, April.
    8. Goldberg, Victor P, 1994. "Recovery for Economic Loss following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, pages 1-39.
    9. Burrows, Paul & Rowley, Charles & Owen, David, 1974. "The economics of accidental oil pollution by tankers in coastal waters," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 251-268.
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    Cited by:

    1. Friesen, Lana, 2006. "The social welfare implications of industry self-auditing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, pages 280-294.
    2. repec:eee:resene:v:48:y:2017:i:c:p:83-97 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Berentsen, Aleksander & Bruegger, Esther & Loertscher, Simon, 2008. "On cheating, doping and whistleblowing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, pages 415-436.
    4. Alfred Endres & Tim Friehe, 2015. "The Compensation Regime in Liability Law: Incentives to Curb Environmental Harm, Ex Ante and Ex Post," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 105-123.
    5. Zivin, Joshua Graff & Pfaff, Alexander S. P., 2004. "To err on humans is not benign: Incentives for adoption of medical error-reporting systems," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, pages 935-949.
    6. Katrin Millock & David Zilberman, 2006. "Collective penalties and inducement of self-reporting," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00118778, HAL.
    7. Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2006. "Leniency policies and illegal transactions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1281-1297.
    8. David A. Hennessy, 2005. "Slaughterhouse Rules: Animal Uniformity and Regulating for Food Safety in Meat Packing," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(3), pages 600-609.
    9. Innes, Robert, 2004. "Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, pages 29-48.
    10. Alexander Pfaff & Chris William Sanchirico, 2004. "Big field, small potatoes: An empirical assessment of EPA's self-audit policy," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(3), pages 415-432.
    11. Alm, James & Shimshack, Jay, 2014. "Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 10(4), pages 209-274, December.
    12. Michael W. Toffel, 2008. "Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the Shadow of the Regulator," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, pages 45-71.
    13. Amy Whritenour Ando & Wallapak Polasub, 2006. "Envelope Backs or the Gold Standard? Choosing the Accuracy of Damage Assessment Methods," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, pages 424-444.
    14. Heiko Gerlach, 2013. "Self-Reporting, Investigation, and Evidentiary Standards," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 1061-1090.
    15. Oded, Sharon, 2011. "Inducing corporate compliance: A compound corporate liability regime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, pages 272-283.
    16. Chan-Kang, Connie & Pardey, Philip G. & Smith, Vincent H., 2006. "The Evolution of Economics Clubs: 1777-2000," Staff Papers 14135, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    17. Marvao, Catarina & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2016. "Cartels and Leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt," SITE Working Paper Series 39, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 16 Nov 2016.
    18. Giannakas, Konstantinos & Kaplan, Jonathan D., 2002. "Conservation Compliance On Highly Erodible Land: An Empirical Auditing Game," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19607, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    19. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00118778 is not listed on IDEAS

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