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Performance of the ambient tax: does the nature of the damage matter?

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  • Nasreddine AMMAR
  • Ahmed ENNASRI
  • Marc Willinger

Abstract

The ambient tax is often considered as an effcient instrument to achieve a rst best outcome of ambient pollution when the regulator is less informed than the polluters. Since the ambient tax was never imple- mented in the eld, empirical evidence is missing. Available experimental ndings provide mixed evidence: effciency is higher under external dam- age, i.e. if ambient pollution affects non-polluters (Spraggon, 2002, 2003) than under internal damage, i.e. if ambient pollution a¤ects polluters themselves (Cochard et al., 2005). Since these two types of experiments relied on very different designs, it is worthwhile to compare them under a common experimental design. Our main nding is that the ambient tax is equally effcient under external damage than under internal damage.

Suggested Citation

  • Nasreddine AMMAR & Ahmed ENNASRI & Marc Willinger, 2011. "Performance of the ambient tax: does the nature of the damage matter?," Working Papers 11-25, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2011.
  • Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:11-25
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    Cited by:

    1. Kene Boun My & Benjamin Ouvrard, 2017. "Nudge and Tax in an Environmental Public Goods Experiment: Does Environmental Sensitivity Matter?," Working Papers of BETA 2017-06, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.

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