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Uncertainty And Incentives For Nonpoint Pollution Control

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  • Segerson, Kathleen

Abstract

This paper describes a general incentive scheme for use in controlling nonpoint pollution problems where actual pollutant loadings have a random distribution that is contingent on the level of abatement undertaken and where direct monitoring of polluting activities is difficult. Special cases and their advantages and disadvantages are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Segerson, Kathleen, 1985. "Uncertainty And Incentives For Nonpoint Pollution Control," 1985 Annual Meeting, August 4-7, Ames, Iowa 278615, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea85:278615
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.278615
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/278615/files/aaea-1985-068.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
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    4. O'Neil, William & David, Martin & Moore, Christina & Joeres, Erhard, 1983. "Transferable discharge permits and economic efficiency: The fox river," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 346-355, December.
    5. Fishelson, Gideon, 1976. "Emission control policies under uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 189-197, October.
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    7. Dilip Mookherjee, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 433-446.
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    10. HOLMSTROM, Bengt, 1979. "Moral hazard and observability," LIDAM Reprints CORE 379, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    11. Adar, Zvi & Griffin, James M., 1976. "Uncertainty and the choice of pollution control instruments," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 178-188, October.
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