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Aléa moral et politiques d'audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d'origine agricole de l'eau

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  • Sandrine SPAETER
  • Alban VERCHERE

Abstract

Compte tenu de l'information incomplète dont on dispose quant aux pratiques culturales des exploitants agricoles, il n'est pas toujours optimal de baser les politiques de lutte contre la pollution d'origine agricole exclusivement sur un mode de taxation. Symétriquement, un système entièrement assis sur des subventions "vertes" se justifie mal dans le cadre de certaines cultures déjà largement subventionnées au niveau européen. Dans cet article, nous montrons qu'une alternative possible consiste à établir un contrat entre l'agriculteur et les instances environnementales qui combine un système de vérification aléatoire des pratiques culturales avec une menace crédible de pénalisation si l'effort environnemental n'est pas suffisant compte tenu des conditions initiales ou, dans le cas contraire, une promesse crédible de versement de subvention. Ce système d'audit, dont l'originalité tient à son caractère aléatoire, doit reposer sur des indicateurs fiables des caractéristiques hydrologiques, pédologiques et agronomiques des parcelles étudiées. Les différentes études effectuées sur la plaine d'Alsace par des équipes pluridisciplinaires montrent qu'il est possible d'établir des cartographies fiables de vulnérabilité de la nappe et des indicateurs permettant une bonne mesure de la pollution due aux intrants (engrais, pesticides, ...).

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  • Sandrine SPAETER & Alban VERCHERE, 2002. "Aléa moral et politiques d'audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d'origine agricole de l'eau," Working Papers of BETA 2002-16, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2002-16
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pollution agricole; nitrates; aléa moral; incitations; audit; contrat optimal.;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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