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Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control

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  • Segerson, Kathleen

Abstract

This paper describes a general incentive scheme for use in controlling nonpoint pollution problems where actual pollutant loadings have a random distribution that is contingent on the level of abatement undertaken and where direct monitoring of polluting activities is difficult. Special cases and their advantages and disadvantages are discussed.
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  • Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:15:y:1988:i:1:p:87-98
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
    2. Fishelson, Gideon, 1976. "Emission control policies under uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 189-197, October.
    3. Martin L. Weitzman, 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(4), pages 477-491.
    4. HOLMSTROM, Bengt, 1979. "Moral hazard and observability," CORE Discussion Papers RP 379, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Thomas H. Tietenberg, 1980. "Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary Source Air Pollution: A Survey and Synthesis," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 56(4), pages 391-416.
    6. O'Neil, William & David, Martin & Moore, Christina & Joeres, Erhard, 1983. "Transferable discharge permits and economic efficiency: The fox river," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 346-355, December.
    7. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
    8. Dilip Mookherjee, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 433-446.
    9. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    10. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    11. Adar, Zvi & Griffin, James M., 1976. "Uncertainty and the choice of pollution control instruments," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 178-188, October.
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