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Property Rights, Theft, Amnesty, and Efficiency

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  • Eliakim Katz
  • Jacob Rosenberg

Abstract

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  • Eliakim Katz & Jacob Rosenberg, 2003. "Property Rights, Theft, Amnesty, and Efficiency," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 219-232, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:15:y:2003:i:3:p:219-232
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1023307310258
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May.
    2. Innes, Robert, 2000. "Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When Violators Have Heterogeneous Probabilities of Apprehension," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 287-300, January.
    3. Malik, Arun S. & Schwab, Robert M., 1991. "The economics of tax amnesties," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 29-49, October.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Carla Marchese & Alberto Cassone, 2000. "Tax Amnesty as Price-Discriminating Behavior by a Monopolistic Government," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 21-32, January.
    6. Innes, Robert, 1999. "Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-393, June.
    7. Livernois, John & McKenna, C. J., 1999. "Truth or consequences: Enforcing pollution standards with self-reporting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 415-440, March.
    8. Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2000. "Amnesties and Co-operation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(3), pages 259-273, May.
    9. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June.
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    Keywords

    theft; amnesty; property rights;
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