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Amnesties and Co-operation

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  • Nicolas Marceau
  • Steeve Mongrain

Abstract

One of the costs of anticipated amnesties is current and future non-compliance with the law. Relatively to a no-amnesty situation, efficient enforcement policies may therefore differ when an amnesty is offered. To study this question, a model is built in which individuals impose a cost on society when they commit a crime. When a criminal participates in an amnesty, or (to a lesser extent) when he is caught, some fraction of the social cost is recovered, reflecting co-operation with the authorities. The analysis characterizes efficient anticipated amnesties. It is shown that the efficient level of enforcement may be smaller in the case of an anticipated amnesty than in a no-amnesty situation. The reason is that despite the increase in the initial number of criminals generated by the amnesty, many criminals eventually participate in it. If participants in the amnesty are very co-operative, then a large proportion of the social cost is recovered making the initial increase in the number of criminals less costly. The optimal level of the reduced sanction imposed on those who participate in the amnesty is also characterized. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2000. "Amnesties and Co-operation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(3), pages 259-273, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:7:y:2000:i:3:p:259-273
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008701612720
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Miguel A. SANCHEZ VILLALBA, 2017. "On the effects of repeated tax amnesties," Journal of Economics and Political Economy, KSP Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 285-301, September.
    3. Julio López Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo Sauco, "undated". "Incidencia de la amnistía fiscal de 1991 en el cumplimiento a largo plazo en el IRPF," Studies on the Spanish Economy 106, FEDEA.
    4. Julio López Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo Sauco, 2002. "El análisis económico de las amnistías fiscales: ¿Qué hemos aprendido hasta ahora?," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 163(4), pages 121-153, December.
    5. Hari Luitel & Mehmet Tosun, 2014. "A reexamination of state fiscal health and amnesty enactment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 21(5), pages 874-893, October.
    6. Eliakim Katz & Jacob Rosenberg, 2003. "Property Rights, Theft, Amnesty, and Efficiency," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 219-232, May.
    7. Paul Dunn & Jonathan Farrar & Cass Hausserman, 2018. "The Influence of Guilt Cognitions on Taxpayers’ Voluntary Disclosures," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 689-701, March.
    8. Casi, Elisa & Nenadic, Sara & Orlic, Mark Dinko & Spengel, Christoph, 2019. "A call to action: From evolution to revolution on the Common Reporting Standard," ZEW Discussion Papers 18-035, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, revised 2019.
    9. Panayiotis Agisilaou, 2013. "Collusion in Industrial Economics and Optimally Designed Leniency Programmes - A Survey," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2013-03, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

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