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Playing without a rulebook: Optimal enforcement when individuals learn the penalty only by committing the crime

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  • Ben-Shahar, Omri

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  • Ben-Shahar, Omri, 1997. "Playing without a rulebook: Optimal enforcement when individuals learn the penalty only by committing the crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 409-421, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:3:p:409-421
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Greenberg, Joseph, 1984. "Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1-13.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Sah, Raaj K, 1991. "Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(6), pages 1272-1295, December.
    4. Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484, January.
    5. Landsberger, Michael & Meilijson, Isaac, 1982. "Incentive generating state dependent penalty system : The case of income tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 333-352.
    6. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1992. "Monitoring vis-a-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 556-565.
    7. Mitchell Polinsky, A. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1991. "A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 291-306.
    8. Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H. & Schulze, William D., 1992. "Why do people pay taxes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 21-38.
    9. Shavell, Steven, 1991. "Specific versus General Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 1088-1108, October.
    10. Kaplow, Louis, 1990. "Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, pages 93-128.
    11. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Kaplow, Louis, 1992. "Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, pages 365-370.
    12. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Kaplow, Louis, 1993. "Optimal sanctions and differences in individuals' likelihood of avoiding detection," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, pages 217-224.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lang, Matthias, 2017. "Legal uncertainty as a welfare enhancing screen," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 274-289.
    2. Rasch, Alexander & Wenzel, Tobias, 2013. "Piracy in a two-sided software market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 78-89.
    3. Mohamed Jellal & Nuno Garoupa, 1999. "Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning," Economics Working Papers 402, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    4. Numa Garoupa, 1999. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Dissemination of Information," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, pages 183-196.
    5. Lars Hansen & Signe Krarup & Clifford Russell, 2006. "Enforcement and Information Strategies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, pages 45-61.
    6. D’Antoni, Massimo & Galbiati, Roberto, 2007. "A signaling theory of nonmonetary sanctions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, pages 204-218.
    7. repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:01:n:s0219198913500035 is not listed on IDEAS

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