Dissuader le crime : un survol
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- Sylvaine Poret & Cyril Téjédo, 2006. "Law enforcement and concentration in illicit drug markets [Mise en œuvre de la loi et concentration sur les marchés des drogues illicites]," Post-Print hal-02656903, HAL.
- Slim, Sadri, 2009. "Du refus de vente au don: une explication de la formation du prix par l´affect [From rejection of exchange to gift: regard as an explanation of prices]," MPRA Paper 15317, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Apr 2009.
- Sylvaine Poret, 2005.
"Structure verticale d'un réseau de distribution de drogues illicites et politique répressive optimale,"
Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 71(4), pages 391-412.
- Sylvaine Poret, 2002. "Structure verticale d’un réseau de distribution de drogues illicites et politique répressive optimale," Working Papers 2002-07, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Sylvaine PORET, 2005. "Structure verticale d’un réseau de distribution de drogues illicites et politique répressive optimale," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2005043, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Sylvaine Poret, 2005. "Structure verticale d'un réseau de distribution de drogues illicites et politique répressive optimale," Post-Print hal-02681719, HAL.
- Poret, Sylvaine, 2009.
"An optimal anti-drug law enforcement policy,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 221-228, September.
- Sylvaine Poret, 2005. "An Optimal Anti-Drug Law Enforcement Policy," Working Papers 2005-17, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Lloyd-Ellis, Huw & Marceau, Nicolas, 2003. "Endogenous insecurity and economic development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 1-29, October.
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