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An Optimal Anti-Drug Law Enforcement Policy

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  • Sylvaine Poret

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Abstract

This paper presents a model of an optimal anti-drug law enforcement policy,whose objective is the reduction of drug-related social cost, including the net costof law enforcement, the social harm, and the surplus of agents. We consider avertically organized distribution system with two levels: traffickers and retailers.The two questions are which type of sellers authorities must pursue, traffickers orretailers, and which sanction a seller has to pay in case of arrest. The optimal levelof fine depends on the type of sellers arrested, the probability of arrest at the timeof a transaction, and the sensitivity of the harm to consumed quantities. We showthat the maximum fine is rarely optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvaine Poret, 2005. "An Optimal Anti-Drug Law Enforcement Policy," Working Papers 2005-17, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2005-17
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    1. Sylvaine Poret, 2005. "Structure verticale d'un réseau de distribution de drogues illicites et politique répressive optimale," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 71(4), pages 391-412.
    2. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Mesnard, Alice & Perrault, Tiffanie, 2023. "Weeding out the dealers? The economics of cannabis legalization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 62-101.
    3. Naranjo, Alberto J., 2010. "Spillover effects of domestic law enforcement policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 265-275, September.
    4. Flores, Daniel, 2016. "Violence and law enforcement in markets for illegal goods," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 77-87.
    5. Prieger James E. & Kulick Jonathan, 2015. "Violence in Illicit Markets: Unintended Consequences and the Search for Paradoxical Effects of Enforcement," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 1263-1295, July.
    6. Adam Jacobsson & Alberto Naranjo, 2009. "Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United States," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 323-343, November.
    7. Yunker, James A., 2012. "Estimated optimal drug law enforcement expenditures based on U.S. annual data," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 356-371.

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