An optimal anti-drug law enforcement policy
This article presents a model for a drug law enforcement policy whose objective is harm reduction, including the net cost of law enforcement, social harm and surplus of agents. We consider a vertically organized distribution system with two levels, traffickers and retailers. The two questions concern which type of sellers have to be prosecuted and which law enforcement policy should be implemented that is, the probability of being caught and the severity of the punishment. We show that a trafficker-oriented law enforcement regime can avoid counter-productive policies. Moreover, decriminalization or depenalization is optimal under some conditions depending on the relationship between social harm and consumption.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ziggy MacDonald, .
"What Price Drug Use? The Contribution of Economics to an Evidence-Based Drugs Policy,"
Discussion Papers in Public Sector Economics
01/6, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
- Ziggy MacDonald, 2004. "What Price Drug Use? The Contribution of Economics to an Evidence-Based Drugs Policy," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 113-152, 04.
- Abdalla Mansour & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2001.
"Gangs and Crime Deterrence,"
Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers
138, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
- Anne Line Bretteville-Jensen & Erik Biørn, 2004. "Do prices count? A micro-econometric study of illicit drug consumption based on self-reported data," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 673-695, 09.
- Poret, Sylvaine & Tejedo, Cyril, 2006. "Law enforcement and concentration in illicit drug markets," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 99-114, March.
- Sylvaine PORET, 2005. "Structure verticale dâ€™un rÃ©seau de distribution de drogues illicites et politique rÃ©pressive optimale," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2005043, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 1999. "Dissuader le crime," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9902, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Saffer, Henry & Chaloupka, Frank, 1999.
"The Demand for Illicit Drugs,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(3), pages 401-11, July.
- Jeffrey A. Miron & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1995. "The Economic Case against Drug Prohibition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 175-192, Fall.
- Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000.
"The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
- Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-95, September.
- Aloys Prinz, 1997. "Drugs: Do European drugs policies matter?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 12(25), pages 371-385, October.
- Andrew Resignato, 2000. "Violent crime: a function of drug use or drug enforcement?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(6), pages 681-688.
- Jonathan P. Caulkins, 1993. "Zero-Tolerance Policies: Do They Inhibit or Stimulate Illicit Drug Consumption?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(4), pages 458-476, April.
- Sylvaine Poret, 2006. "L'impact des politiques répressives sur l'offre de drogues illicites. Une revue de la littérature théorique," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(5), pages 1065-1091.
- Chiu, Stephen & Mansley, Edward C. & Morgan, John, 1998. "Choosing the right battlefield for the war on drugs: an irrelevance result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 107-111, April.
- Lee, Li Way, 1993. "Would Harassing Drug Users Work?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 939-59, October.
- Skott, Peter & Thorlund Jepsen, Gunnar, 2002. "Paradoxical effects of drug policy in a model with imperfect competition and switching costs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 335-354, August.
- Poret, Sylvaine, 2002. "Paradoxical effects of law enforcement policies: the case of the illicit drug market," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 465-493, December.
- Becker, Gary S & Grossman, Michael & Murphy, Kevin M, 1991.
"Rational Addiction and the Effect of Price on Consumption,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 237-41, May.
- Gary S.Grossman Becker & Michael Murphy & Kevin M., 1991. "Rational Addiction and the Effect of Price on Consumption," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 68, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 1999. "Dissuader le crime : un survol," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 123-147, mars-juin.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:29:y:2009:i:3:p:221-228. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.