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Structure verticale d’un réseau de distribution de drogues illicites et politique répressive optimale

  • Sylvaine Poret


Cet article s'attache à donner des fondements théoriques à la structure verticale des réseaux de distribution des drogues illicites, en faisant appel à l'analyse des relations verticales et en intégrant le caractère illégal de cette activité. Il analyse ensuite la manière dont les autorités, par l'intermédiaire des coûts de répression qu'elles imposent aux vendeurs de drogues, peuvent mettre en œuvre dans le cadre d'un équilibre décentralisé l'optimum social. Nous montrons qu'un réseau verticalement séparé, structure optimale de premier rang, très couramment observée sur ce marché, ne peut jamais être mis en œuvre.

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Paper provided by Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique in its series Working Papers with number 2002-07.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2002-07
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  1. Henry Saffer & Frank Chaloupka, 1995. "The Demand for Illicit Drugs," NBER Working Papers 5238, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 1999. "Dissuader le crime," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9902, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
  3. Abdalla Mansour & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2001. "Gangs and Crime Deterrence," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 138, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  4. Jeffrey A. Miron & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1995. "The Economic Case against Drug Prohibition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 175-192, Fall.
  5. Chiu, Stephen & Mansley, Edward C. & Morgan, John, 1998. "Choosing the right battlefield for the war on drugs: an irrelevance result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 107-111, April.
  6. Becker, Gary S & Murphy, Kevin M, 1988. "A Theory of Rational Addiction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(4), pages 675-700, August.
  7. Lee, Li Way, 1993. "Would Harassing Drug Users Work?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 939-59, October.
  8. Jonathan P. Caulkins, 1997. "Modeling the Domestic Distribution Network for Illicit Drugs," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(10), pages 1364-1371, October.
  9. Poret, Sylvaine, 2009. "An optimal anti-drug law enforcement policy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 221-228, September.
  10. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 1999. "Dissuader le crime : un survol," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 123-147, mars-juin.
  11. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 347.
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