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On The Deterrent Effect Of Individual Versus Collective Liability In Criminal Organizations

Author

Listed:
  • Laetitia HAURET

    (Centre d Etudes de Populations de Pauvret et de Politiques Socio Economiques International Network for Studies in Technology Environment Alternatives Development Differdange Luxembourg)

  • Eric LANGLAIS

    (Nancy University EconomiX and CEREFIGE France)

  • Carine SONNTAG

    (ICN Business School Nancy France)

Abstract

Our paper addresses the question of the deterrent effect of a monetary sanction associated to a collective rather than an individual liability when crimes are realized within a hierarchical gang defined as a criminal organization where the leader is a sleeping partner and several agents are active partners in the illegal or criminal activity We develop a model where the active gang members face contradictory incentives to commit a crime On the one hand public authorities try to deter each gang member by imposing sanctions on the second the leader of the gang try to keep his members enough active in the gang by threatening them of private sanctions We show that sanctions based on individual liability are inefficient to deter gang s members since the leader overreacts on the public sanctions In contrast we show that a regime of collective liability allowing the judge to sanction the sleeping partner even if he hasn t realized any crime himself can reach enough deterrence of the members of the gang

Suggested Citation

  • Laetitia HAURET & Eric LANGLAIS & Carine SONNTAG, 2011. "On The Deterrent Effect Of Individual Versus Collective Liability In Criminal Organizations," Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, ASERS Publishing, vol. 2(4), pages 125-135.
    • Handle: RePEc:srs:jarle0:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:125-135
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    JEL classification:

    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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