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Law enforcement and concentration in illicit drug markets

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  • Poret, Sylvaine
  • Tejedo, Cyril

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  • Poret, Sylvaine & Tejedo, Cyril, 2006. "Law enforcement and concentration in illicit drug markets," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 99-114, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:22:y:2006:i:1:p:99-114
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lee, Li Way, 1993. "Would Harassing Drug Users Work?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 939-959, October.
    2. Robert Burrus, 1999. "Do efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs increase turf war violence? a theoretical analysis," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 23(3), pages 226-234, September.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Abdala Mansour & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2006. "Gangs and Crime Deterrence," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 315-339, October.
    5. Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(2), pages 278-288, April.
    6. Jonathan P. Caulkins, 1993. "Zero-Tolerance Policies: Do They Inhibit or Stimulate Illicit Drug Consumption?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(4), pages 458-476, April.
    7. Saffer, Henry & Chaloupka, Frank, 1999. "The Demand for Illicit Drugs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(3), pages 401-411, July.
    8. Poret, Sylvaine, 2002. "Paradoxical effects of law enforcement policies: the case of the illicit drug market," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 465-493, December.
    9. Richard Gilbert & Xavier Vives, 1986. "Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 71-83.
    10. Becker, Gary S & Grossman, Michael & Murphy, Kevin M, 1991. "Rational Addiction and the Effect of Price on Consumption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 237-241, May.
    11. Eatherly, Billy J, 1974. "Drug-Law Enforcement: Should We Arrest Pushers or Users?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 210-214, Jan.-Feb..
    12. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-295, September.
    13. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 1999. "Dissuader le crime : un survol," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 123-147, mars-juin.
    14. Skott, Peter & Thorlund Jepsen, Gunnar, 2002. "Paradoxical effects of drug policy in a model with imperfect competition and switching costs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 335-354, August.
    15. Chiu, Stephen & Mansley, Edward C. & Morgan, John, 1998. "Choosing the right battlefield for the war on drugs: an irrelevance result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 107-111, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sylvaine Poret, 2006. "L'impact des politiques répressives sur l'offre de drogues illicites. Une revue de la littérature théorique," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(5), pages 1065-1091.
    2. Carlos Casacuberta & Mariana Gerstenblüth & Patricia Triunfo, 2012. "Aportes del análisis económico al estudio de las drogas," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0112, Department of Economics - dECON.
    3. Slim, Sadri, 2009. "Du refus de vente au don: une explication de la formation du prix par l´affect
      [From rejection of exchange to gift: regard as an explanation of prices]
      ," MPRA Paper 15317, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Apr 2009.
    4. Leonardo Raffo López & José Luis Segura, 2015. "Las redes del narcotráfico y sus interacciones: un modelo teórico," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 17(32), pages 183-212, January-J.
    5. Poret, Sylvaine, 2009. "An optimal anti-drug law enforcement policy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 221-228, September.
    6. Naranjo, Alberto J., 2010. "Spillover effects of domestic law enforcement policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 265-275, September.
    7. Leonardo Raffo López, 2015. "Law enforcement and drug trafficking networks: a simple model," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO-CIDSE 013014, UNIVERSIDAD DEL VALLE - CIDSE.
    8. Adam Jacobsson & Alberto Naranjo, 2009. "Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United States," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 323-343, November.
    9. Flores, Daniel, 2016. "Violence and law enforcement in markets for illegal goods," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 77-87.
    10. repec:bla:manchs:v:85:y:2017:i:5:p:541-576 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Kyle W. O’Donnell, 2015. "The cultural and political economy of drug prohibition," Chapters,in: Culture and Economic Action, chapter 19, pages 418-435 Edward Elgar Publishing.

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