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Gangs and Crime Deterrence

  • Abdala Mansour
  • Nicolas Marceau
  • Steeve Mongrain

A framework is developed in which the formation of gangs--the criminal market structure--is endogenous. As in standard models of crime, under a given gang structure, an increase in deterrence reduces criminal output. However, under identifiable circumstances, an increase in deterrence can lead to an increase in the number of competing criminal gangs and to an increase in total illegal output, possibly accompanied with a fall in the price. We show that an increase in demand can also modify the criminal market structure and can ultimately affect the output and the price in a similar way. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.

Volume (Year): 22 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 315-339

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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:22:y:2006:i:2:p:315-339
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  1. Sylvaine Poret, 2001. "The Illicit Drug Market : Paradoxical Effects of Law Enforcement Policies," Working Papers 2001-02, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  2. Besley, Timothy, 1989. "Commodity taxation and imperfect competition : A note on the effects of entry," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 359-367, December.
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  7. John B. Burbidge & James A. DePater & Gordon M. Myers & Abhijit Sengupta, 1996. "A Coalition-formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Block s," Department of Economics Working Papers 1996-05, McMaster University.
  8. Nicolas Marceau & Gordon M. Myers, 2000. "From Foraging to Agriculture," Discussion Papers dp00-07, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, revised Feb 2000.
  9. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers 98-1, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1998.
  10. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
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  12. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
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