Coalition Formation in Political Games
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Shu Yu & Richard Jong-A-Pin, 2016.
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More about this item
KeywordsCoalition Formation; Collective Choice; Cooperative Game Theory; Political Economy; Self-Enforcing Coalitions; Stability;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-12-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-12-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2006-12-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PBE-2006-12-16 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2006-12-16 (Positive Political Economics)
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