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An Overview of Coalitions and Networks Formation Models for Economic Applications

  • Marco A. Marini

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Urbino, Urbino, (Italy))

This paper presents some recent developments in the theory of coalition and network formation. For this purpose, a few major equilibrium concepts recently introduced to model the formation of coalition structures and networks among players are brie?y reviewed and discussed. Some economic applications are also illustrated to give the ?avour of the type of predictions such models are able to provide.

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File URL: http://host.uniroma3.it/centri/crei/pubblicazioni/workingpapers2007/CREI_07_2007.pdf
File Function: First version, 2007
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Paper provided by CREI Università degli Studi Roma Tre in its series Working Papers with number 0707.

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Length: 88 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision: 2007
Handle: RePEc:rcr:wpaper:07_07
Contact details of provider: Postal: Via Ostiense, 161, 00154 ROMA
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Web page: http://host.uniroma3.it/centri/crei/
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  1. Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 68, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  2. Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Rahmi Ilkiliç, 2005. "Pairwise-Stability and Nash Equilibria in Network Formation," Working Papers 2005.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Sumit Joshi, 2000. "Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0623, Econometric Society.
  4. Bloch, Francis & Jackson, Matthew, 2004. "The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players," Working Papers 1194, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  5. Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2002. "Strongly Stable Networks," Working Papers 1147, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  6. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
  7. Francis Bloch & Matthew Jackson, 2006. "Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 305-318, October.
  8. Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1996. "Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 218-226, April.
  9. Paul Belleflamme & Francis Bloch, 2004. "Market sharing agreements and collusive networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(2), pages 387-411, 05.
  10. Marco Marini & Sergio Currarini, 2004. "Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies," Working Papers 2004.43, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  11. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  12. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
  13. Francis Bloch, 1995. "Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 537-556, Autumn.
  14. Dutta, B. & van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 2003. "Link formation in cooperative situations," Other publications TiSEM 840ac1d0-9e23-41a7-832e-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  15. Marini, Marco A. & Currarini, Sergio, 2003. "A sequential approach to the characteristic function and the core in games with externalities," MPRA Paper 1689, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2003.
  16. Bloch, Francis, 2002. "Coalitions and Networks in Industrial Organization," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 70(1), pages 36-55, January.
  17. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
  18. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
  19. Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1997. "Stable Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 322-344, October.
    • Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1996. "Stable Networks," Working Papers 971, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  20. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Papers 21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  22. Goyal, S. & Joshi, S., 2000. "Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI 9952-/A, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
  23. Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S., 2003. "The Role of Trust in Costly Network Formation," Discussion Paper 2003-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  24. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
  25. Greenberg, Joseph, 1994. "Coalition structures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 37, pages 1305-1337 Elsevier.
  26. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
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