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Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining

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  • Iaryczower, Matias
  • Oliveros, Santiago

Abstract

We study a model of decentralized legislative bargaining over public decisions with transfers. We establish the emergence of middlemen in legislative bargaining as a robust equilibrium phenomenon. We show that legislative intermediation can impact policy outcomes, and can be inefficient. To fulfill this role, the middleman's policy preferences and bargaining position must be such that its role of intermediary is credible. But the political middleman must also directly benefit from policy change. The results highlight fundamental differences between the role of intermediaries in politics and exchange economies.

Suggested Citation

  • Iaryczower, Matias & Oliveros, Santiago, 2016. "Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 209-236.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:162:y:2016:i:c:p:209-236
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.011
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    Cited by:

    1. Casella, Alessandra & Turban, Sébastien, 2014. "Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 47-70.
    2. repec:esx:essedp:768 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Dimitrios Xefteris & Nicholas Ziros, 2017. "Strategic Vote Trading in Power Sharing Systems," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 76-94, May.
    4. Matias Iaryczower & Santiago Oliveros, 2017. "Competing for Loyalty: The Dynamics of Rallying Support," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(10), pages 2990-3005, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Intermediaries; Middlemen; Bargaining; Legislatures; Vote buying;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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