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Intermediation in Search Markets

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  • Gehrig, Thomas

Abstract

In markets, in which exchange requires costly search for trading partners, intermediaries can help to reduce the trading frictions. This intuition is modelled in a framework with heterogeneous agents, who have the chocie between intermediated exchange and search accompanied by some bargaining procedure. The equilibria of such a game are characterized. In the case of a monopolistic intermediary the tradeoff between the bid-ask spread and the costs of delay during private search determine the intermediary's clientele. In equilibrium the monopolist charges a positive spread. Traders with large gains from trade prefer to deal with him, whereas traders with relatively low gains from trade engage in search. In case of competition among intermediaries the classical Bertrand result obtains and bid and ask prices converge to the (unique) Walrasian equilibrium price. Thus in the confines of the model the Walrasian auctioneer of the market under consideration can be replaced by competing intermediaries. In addition a multiplicity of subgame perfect Nash edquilibria emphasizes the coordination problemms inherent in models of intermediation.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Gehrig, Thomas, 1993. "Intermediation in Search Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 97-120, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:2:y:1993:i:1:p:97-120
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1993.00097.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    2. Glosten, Lawrence R. & Milgrom, Paul R., 1985. "Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 71-100, March.
    3. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    4. Stahl, Dale O, II, 1988. "Bertrand Competition for Inputs and Walrasian Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 189-201, March.
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    6. Yavas, Abdullah, 1992. "Marketmakers versus matchmakers," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 33-58, March.
    7. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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