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Intermediation in Search Markets

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  • Thomas Gehrig

Abstract

In markets, in which exchange requires costly search for trading partners, intermediaries can help to reduce the trading frictions. This intuition is modeled in a framework with heterogeneous agents, who have the choice between intermediated exchange and search accompanied by some bargaining procedure. The equilibria of such a game are characterized. In the case of a monopolistic intermediary, the tradeoff between the bid‐ask spread and the costs of delay during private search determine the intermediary's clientele. In equilibrium the monopolist charges a positive spread. Traders with large gains from trade prefer to deal with him, whereas traders with relatively low gains from trade engage in search. In case of competition among intermediaries, the classical Bertrand result obtains, and bid and ask prices converge to the (unique) Walrasian equilibrium price. Thus, in the confines of the model, the Walrasian auctioneer of the market under consideration can be replaced by competing intermediaries. In addition a multiplicity of subgame perfect Nash equilibria emphasizes the coordination problems inherent in models of intermediation.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Gehrig, 1993. "Intermediation in Search Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 97-120, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:2:y:1993:i:1:p:97-120
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1993.00097.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Glosten, Lawrence R. & Milgrom, Paul R., 1985. "Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 71-100, March.
    2. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    3. Stahl, Dale O, II, 1988. "Bertrand Competition for Inputs and Walrasian Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 189-201, March.
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