Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value
A transferable utility economy, in which each agent holds a resource that can be used in combination with the resources of other agents to generate value (according to the characteristics function V), is studied using a dynamic model of bargaining. The main theorem establishes that the payoffs associated with efficient equilibria converge to the agents' Shapley values as the time between periods of the dynamic game goes to zero. In addition, it is demonstrated that an efficient equilibrium exists and is unique when an additivity condition is satisfied. Copyright 1989 by The Econometric Society.
Volume (Year): 57 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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