Gangs and Crime Deterrence
A framework is developed in which the formation of gangs --- the criminal market structure --- is endogenous. We examine the impact of crime deterrence in this framework. It is shown that for a given gang structure, an increase in deterrence reduces criminal output. However, under identifiable circumstances, an increase in deterrence can also lead to an increase in the number of competing criminal gangs and to an increase in total illegal output. Nous étudions un monde dans lequel la formation de gangs criminels est endogène, l'ensemble des gangs criminels constituant la structure de marché d'un bien illégal. Nous étudions l'impact de la dissuasion du crime dans un tel cadre. Pour une structure de marché donnée, accroître la dissuasion tend à réduire la production du bien illégal. Cependant, dans certains cas, accroître la dissuasion peut conduire a un accroissement du nombre de gangs criminels dans le marché et donc, à une plus grande concurrence. Il est alors possible que la production du bien illégal augmente.
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