Can Punishment Generate Specific Deterrence without Updating? Analysis of a Stated Choice Scenario
This study explores the specific deterrence generated by punishment in the context of regulatory violations with a focus on the distinction between upward revisions to future punishment parameters â€“ likelihood and severity â€“ and the experience of being penalized. In order to avoid the pitfalls of empirically analyzing actual choices made by regulated entities, e.g., measuring entitiesâ€™ beliefs regarding the likelihood and size of future penalties, our study examines behavior associated with a stated choice scenario presented within a survey distributed to the environmental managers of facilities regulated under the U.S. Clean Water Act. This choice of respondents strengthens the external validity of our empirical results. Based on a variety of statistical methods, our empirical results strongly and robustly reject the standard hypothesis that specific deterrence stems solely from upward revisions to punishment parameters while supporting the alternative hypothesis of experiential deterrence, whereby facilities focus on recent experiences to shape their compliance behavior.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +61 7 3365 6570
Fax: +61 7 3365 7299
Web page: http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/Email:
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Simonsohn, Uri & Karlsson, Niklas & Loewenstein, George & Ariely, Dan, 2008. "The tree of experience in the forest of information: Overweighing experienced relative to observed information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 263-286, January.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999.
"The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,"
NBER Working Papers
6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eckert, Heather, 2004. "Inspections, warnings, and compliance: the case of petroleum storage regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 232-259, March.
- Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Kaplow, Louis, 1992.
"Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension,"
The Journal of Legal Studies,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 365-70, June.
- Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, 1992. "Optimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension," NBER Working Papers 4079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Malik, Arun S., 1990. "Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 97-106, March.
- Nuno Garoupa, 2003. "Behavioral Economic Analysis of Crime: A Critical Review," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 5-15, January.
- Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
- Lance Lochner, 2003.
"Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System,"
NBER Working Papers
9474, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lance Lochner, 2007. "Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 444-460, March.
- Lance Lochner, 2005. "Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System," 2005 Meeting Papers 452, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Gray, Wayne B. & Deily, Mary E., 1996. "Compliance and Enforcement: Air Pollution Regulation in the U.S. Steel Industry," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 96-111, July.
- Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1998. "On offense history and the theory of deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 305-324, September.
- Arimura, Toshi & Hibiki, Akira & Katayama, Hajime, 2007.
"Is a Voluntary Approach an Effective Environmental Policy Instrument? A Case for Environmental Management Systems,"
dp-07-31, Resources For the Future.
- Arimura, Toshi H. & Hibiki, Akira & Katayama, Hajime, 2008. "Is a voluntary approach an effective environmental policy instrument?: A case for environmental management systems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 281-295, May.
- Earnhart, Dietrich, 2004. "Regulatory factors shaping environmental performance at publicly-owned treatment plants," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 655-681, July.
- Michael P. Haselhuhn & Devin G. Pope & Maurice E. Schweitzer & Peter Fishman, 2012. "The Impact of Personal Experience on Behavior: Evidence from Video-Rental Fines," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 52-61, January.
- Nakamura, Masao & Takahashi, Takuya & Vertinsky, Ilan, 2001. "Why Japanese Firms Choose to Certify: A Study of Managerial Responses to Environmental Issues," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 23-52, July.
- Sah, R.K., 1990.
"Social Osmosis And Patterns Of Crime: A Dynamic Economic Analysis,"
609, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
- Kaplow, Louis, 1990. "Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 93-128, Spring.
- Scholz, John T & Gray, Wayne B, 1990. " OSHA Enforcement and Workplace Injuries: A Behavioral Approach to Risk Assessment," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 283-305, September.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1991.
"A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders,"
NBER Working Papers
3739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Shimshack, Jay P. & Ward, Michael B., 2005.
"Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance,"
25994, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Shimshack, Jay P. & Ward, Michael B., 2005. "Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 519-540, November.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
- Anton, W.R.Q.Wilma Rose Q. & Deltas, George & Khanna, Madhu, 2004.
"Incentives for environmental self-regulation and implications for environmental performance,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 632-654, July.
- Anton, Wilma Rose Q. & Deltas, George & Khanna, Madhu, 2002. "Incentives for Environmental Self-Regulation and Implications for Environmental Performance," Working Papers 02-0120, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
- Bigoni, Maria & Le Coq, Chloé & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2008. "Risk Aversion, Prospect Theory, and Strategic Risk in Law Enforcement: Evidence From an Antitrust Experiment," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 696, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack, 2011. "The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 3-24, Winter.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qld:uq2004:468. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SOE IT)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.