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Honnêteté et conformité environnementale

Listed author(s):
  • Philippe Bontems
  • Gilles Rotillon
Registered author(s):

    [eng] Integrity and Environmental Compliance by Philippe Bontems and Gilles Rotillon We here study how the existence of conscientious attitudes affects the working of compliance between an environmental agency and polluting firms, where the supervision policy may or may not include firms' self-reporting of discharges. Two main findings have been made. Firstly, non-interference may be the best policy for the agency if there is a high enough proportion of conscientious firms. Secondly, contrary to what we might expect, an exogenous increase in the number of conscientious firms does not necessarily lead to a decrease in pollution. We show that it is in fact possible that, given the number of conscientious firms, the optimum probability of inspection is low enough to entail a growth in fraud and therefore pollution. Moreover, with the system of self-reporting, which is the optimum option, an increase in the number of conscientious firms may also in some cases involve an increase in the total cost of inspection and, ultimately, welfare losses. [fre] Nous étudions dans cette note les conséquences de l'existence de comportement d'honnêteté dans un jeu de conformité entre une agence environnementale et des firmes polluantes où la politique de contrôle comprend ou non une auto-déclaration des firmes en ce qui concerne les rejets polluants. Deux résultats principaux sont obtenus. Premièrement, le laissez-faire peut être une politique optimale pour l'agence quand la proportion de firmes honnêtes est suffisamment grande. Deuxièmement, contrairement à l'intuition, un accroissement exogène du nombre de firmes honnêtes ne conduit pas nécessairement à une diminution de la pollution. Nous montrons en effet qu'il se peut que compte tenu du nombre d'honnêtes la probabilité d'inspection optimale soit suffisamment faible pour impliquer un accroissement de la fraude et donc de la pollution. De plus, avec le mécanisme d'auto-déclaration, qu'il est optimal de mettre en place, l'accroissement du nombre d'honnêtes peut aussi dans certains cas impliquer un accroissement du coût d'inspection total et in fine des pertes de bien-être.

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    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

    Volume (Year): 143 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 117-127

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_143_2_6095
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2000.6095
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    1. Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May.
    2. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
    4. Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
    5. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June.
    6. Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, 1994. "Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    7. Saïd Souam, 1998. "Dissuasion de la collusion et efficacité de deux systèmes d'amendes," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(3), pages 755-765.
    8. Jones, Carol Adaire & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1990. "The social cost of uniform regulatory standards in a hierarchical government," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 61-72, July.
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