Efficient Committed Budget for Implementing Target Audit Probability for Many Inspectees
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- Andrew Yim, 2009. "Efficient Committed Budget for Implementing Target Audit Probability for Many Inspectees," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(12), pages 2000-2018, December.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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More about this item
Keywordsaudit sampling plan; audit budget; tax audit; tax compliance; tax evasion; inspection game; appropriation and rescission;
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law
- M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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