Inspectors or Google Earth? Optimal fiscal policies under uncertain detection of evaders
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KeywordsTax evasion - Tax rates - Enforcement - Imperfect audits - Investments in tax administration;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2010-09-25 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2010-09-25 (Public Economics)
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