On the Shadow Price of a Tax Inspector
Many legislatures and advisers, frustrated by the existence of widespread tax evasion, are tempted to increase the investigative and the punitive power of the tax administration. In order to ensure that this additional power is not abused, an analysis of the decision-making process of the tax administration is called for. In this paper, the authors model the process of auditing tax returns as a decision tree. The model enables the user to calculate the return on various activities and the efficiency of the tax administration. The method is illustrated by data from Israel.
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Volume (Year): 44 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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