Misreporting, Retroactive Audit and Redistribution
In this paper, we investigate an audit policy that allows a regulator to control past declarations of an agent who is caught to fraud in the current period or to adopt an action that is not desirable for Society. Coupled with redistribution effects due to the production of a public good, we show that retroactivity has not always the desired effect on the level of evasion or the level of effort, once the agent has decided to deviate from a given objective. Nevertheless, we derive conditions under which retroactivity lessens fraudulent behaviors, in quantity and in value. As a related result, authorities should communicate about how they use the individual contributions but information should not be completely transparent in order to fight efficiently against deviation. Redistribution and retroactivity may have opposite effects on the behavior of the agent when combined together.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2006|
|Date of revision:||Nov 2006|
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- Leo K. Simon & Sophie Thoyer & Sylvie Morardet & Rachael E. Goodhue & Patrick Rio & Gordon C. Rausser, 2006.
"Structure and bargaining power in multilateral negotiations : Application to water management policies in France,"
06-09, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2006.
- Simon, Leo K. & Thoyer, Sophie & Morardet, Sylvie & Goodhue, Rachael E. & Rio, Patrick & Rausser, Gordon C., 2003. "Structure and bargaining power in multilateral negotiations: Application to water management policies in France," 2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia 58258, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
- Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1990. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Progressivity of Income Taxes," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 410-31, Fall.
- Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
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