Can whistleblower programs reduce tax evasion? Experimental evidence
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DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.101459
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- David Masclet & Claude Montmarquette & Nathalie Viennot-Briot, 2019. "Can Whistleblower Programs Reduce Tax Evasion? Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-02301968, HAL.
- David Masclet & Claude Montmarquette & Nathalie Viennot-Briot, 2018. "Can Whistleblower Programs Reduce Tax Evasion? Experimental Evidence," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 2018-11, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Philipp Chapkovski & Luca Corazzini & Valeria Maggian, 2021. "Does Whistleblowing on Tax Evaders Reduce Ingroup Cooperation?," Working Papers 2021:20, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Rustam Romaniuc & Dimitri Dubois & Eugen Dimant & Adrian Lupusor & Valeriu Prohnitchi, 2022.
"Understanding cross-cultural differences in peer reporting practices: evidence from tax evasion games in Moldova and France,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 127-147, January.
- Rostan Romaniuc & Dimitri Dubois & Eugen Dimant & Adrian Lupusor & Valeriu Prohnitchi, 2020. "Understanding Cross-Cultural Dfferences in Peer Reporting Practices: Evidence from Tax Evasion Games in Moldova and France," CEE-M Working Papers hal-02991776, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
- Rostan Romaniuc & Dimitri Dubois & Eugen Dimant & Adrian Lupusor & Valeriu Prohnitchi, 2020. "Understanding Cross-Cultural Dfferences in Peer Reporting Practices: Evidence from Tax Evasion Games in Moldova and France," Working Papers hal-02991776, HAL.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Nyreröd, Theo, 2021. "A Fresh Look at Whistleblower Rewards," SITE Working Paper Series 56, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Fiscal fraud; Whistleblowers; Ambiguous risk; Laboratory experiment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
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