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Whistleblowing vs. Random Audit: An Experimental Test of Relative Efficiency

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  • Cécile Bazart
  • Mickael Beaud
  • Dimitri Dubois

Abstract

This paper reports an experimental test of the relative efficiency of a whistleblowing‐based audit scheme compared to a random‐based audit scheme. We design a between‐subjects laboratory experiment with two treatments: a benchmark with a random‐based audit scheme and an alternative treatment in which taxpayers can blow the whistle. Compared to the benchmark, the whistleblowing‐based audit scheme (i) improves the targeting of evaders, (ii) decreases the monetary amount of tax evasion, and (iii) raises the tax levy.

Suggested Citation

  • Cécile Bazart & Mickael Beaud & Dimitri Dubois, 2020. "Whistleblowing vs. Random Audit: An Experimental Test of Relative Efficiency," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(1), pages 47-67, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:73:y:2020:i:1:p:47-67
    DOI: 10.1111/kykl.12215
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    Cited by:

    1. Burgstaller, Lilith & Pfeil, Katharina, 2024. "Why whistleblowing does not deter collaborative tax evasion," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 24/3, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    2. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Nyreröd, Theo, 2021. "A Fresh Look at Whistleblower Rewards," SITE Working Paper Series 56, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
    3. Rustam Romaniuc & Dimitri Dubois & Eugen Dimant & Adrian Lupusor & Valeriu Prohnitchi, 2022. "Understanding cross-cultural differences in peer reporting practices: evidence from tax evasion games in Moldova and France," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 127-147, January.
    4. Peterson K. Ozili, 2020. "Tax evasion and financial instability," Journal of Financial Crime, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 27(2), pages 531-539, January.
    5. Philipp Chapkovski & Luca Corazzini & Valeria Maggian, 2021. "Does Whistleblowing on Tax Evaders Reduce Ingroup Cooperation?," Working Papers 2021:20, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    6. Masclet, David & Montmarquette, Claude & Viennot-Briot, Nathalie, 2019. "Can whistleblower programs reduce tax evasion? Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 83(C).

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