Beyond Punishment: a tax compliance experiment with taxpayers in Costa Rica
Tax compliance experiments have been conducted with students and have focused on the effects of deterrence on tax compliance. However, important insights can be gained looking at alternative instruments. A main purpose of this paper is to conduct an experiment in Costa Rica not with students (exclusively) but with taxpayers, holding traditional factors, such as the probability of penalty and the fine rate, constant and thus analyzing to which extent other factors as fiscal exchange, moral suasion, and positive rewards systematically influence tax compliance. Our findings indicate that these factors increase ceteris paribus the compliance rate.
Volume (Year): 18 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
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