Les comportements de fraude fiscale. Le face à face contribuables — administration fiscale
[fre] Le face à face contribuables-administration fiscale. La particularité du délit de fraude fiscale tient dans l'agent à l'encontre duquel il s'exerce. Cet agent, l'Etat a la particularité d'être, via son administration fiscale, l'organisateur de la perception des sommes dues et l'instigateur du contrôle. Il constitue en cela une victime bien peu ordinaire d'un délit puisqu'il dispose des ressources et du pouvoir nécessaire pour lutter contre l'offense faite à son encontre. La fraude fiscale, transgression de la loi fiscale ne peut donc être analysée indépendamment des procédures de contrôle établies pour s'assurer de la sincérité des déclarations, ou recouvrer les sommes dues. Ceci justifie que nous insistions sur l'interaction des deux parties au problème, les contribuables et l'administration fiscale, et que nous parlions de face à face fiscal. La forme de la fraude, tributaire de la technique d'imposition mais aussi des risques encourus, a alors toutes les chances de se révéler évolutive, impliquant en parallèle une adaptation des mesures instaurées pour la contraindre. [eng] Tax evasion differs from other economic crimes owing to the fact that it is committed against a specific agent. This agent, the government, has the characteristic of being in charge, through the tax administration, of both the collection of taxes and the enforcement of measures designed to stamp out evasion. Thus, it has the resources, the power, to fight against this deviance. Therefore, it becomes obligatory to analyse, simultaneously, the behaviour of tax evaders and the mechanisms that are implemented to promote the collection of the amounts due by taxpayers. This justifies that we concentrate on this confrontation between taxpayers and tax administration. Moreover, tax evasion schemes, as they depend upon taxation rules as well as on the risks born by the individual in the case of detection, will then turn out to be evolutionary, implying parallel accommodation of deterrent actions undertaken by tax officials.
Volume (Year): 16 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/rfeco|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Suzanne Scotchmer & Joel Slemrod, 1988.
"Randomness in Tax Enforcement,"
NBER Working Papers
2512, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hite, Peggy A. & McGill, Gary A., 1992. "An Examination of Taxpayer Preference for Aggressive Tax Advice," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 45(4), pages 389-403, December.
- Alm, James & Jackson, Betty & McKee, Michael J., 1992. "Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with Experimental Data," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 45(1), pages 107-14, March.
- Spicer, Michael W. & Thomas, J. Everett, 1982. "Audit probabilities and the tax evasion decision: An experimental approach," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 241-245, September.
- Hasseldine, D. John & Bebbington, K. Jan, 1991. "Blending economic deterrence and fiscal psychology models in the design of responses to tax evasion: The New Zealand experience," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 299-324, June.
- Alm, James & McCallin, Nancy J, 1990. "Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion as a Joint Portfolio Choice," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 45(2), pages 193-200.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
- Spicer, M W & Lundstedt, S B, 1976. "Understanding Tax Evasion," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 31(2), pages 295-305.
- Jung, Young H. & Snow, Arthur & Trandel, Gregory A., 1994. "Tax evasion and the size of the underground economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 391-402, July.
- Friedland, Nehemiah & Maital, Shlomo & Rutenberg, Aryeh, 1978. "A simulation study of income tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 107-116, August.
- Becker, Winfried & Buchner, Heinz-Jurgen & Sleeking, Simon, 1987. "The impact of public transfer expenditures on tax evasion : An experimental approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 243-252, November.
- Christiansen, Vidar, 1980. "Two comments on tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 389-393, June.
- Jonathan S. Feinstein, 1991. "An Econometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion and its Detection," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 14-35, Spring.
- Koskela, Erkki, 1983. "A note on progression, penalty schemes and tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 127-133, October.
- Graetz, Michael J & Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986.
"The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, Spring.
- Graetz, Michael J. & Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., . "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," Working Papers 589, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Wahlund, Richard, 1992. "Tax changes and economic behavior: The case of tax evasion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 657-677, December.
- Bordignon, Massimo, 1993. "A fairness approach to income tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 345-362, October.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1988. "A Note on Enforcement Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(4), pages 793-98, November.
- Spicer, Michael W. & Hero, Rodney E., 1985. "Tax evasion and heuristics : A research note," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 263-267, March.
- Beck, Paul J. & Jung, Woon-Oh, 1989. "Taxpayer compliance under uncertainty," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-27.
- Christiansen, Vidar, 1980. "Two Comments on Tax Evasion," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 389-93, June.
- Grasmick, Harold G. & Scott, Wilbur J., 1982. "Tax evasion and mechanisms of social control: A comparison with grand and petty theft," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 213-230, September.
- Falkinger, Josef, 1988. "Tax Evasion and Equity: A Theoretical Analysis," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 43(3), pages 388-95.
- Dubin, Jeffrey A. & Wilde, Louis L., 1988. "An Empirical Analysis of Federal Income Tax Auditing and Compliance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 41(1), pages 61-74, March.
- Landskroner, Yoram & Paroush, J & Swary, Itzhak, 1990. "Tax Evasion and Portfolio Decisions," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 45(3), pages 409-22.
- Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-73, August.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
- Thurman, Quint C, 1991. "Taxpayer Noncompliance and General Prevention: An Expansion of the Deterrence Model," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 46(2), pages 289-98.
- Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H. & Schulze, William D., 1992. "Why do people pay taxes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-38, June.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(3), pages 739-60, October.
- Cross, Rodney & Shaw, G K, 1982. "On the Economics of Tax Aversion," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 37(1), pages 36-47.
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2002_num_16_4_1524. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.