Les comportements de fraude fiscale. Le face à face contribuables — administration fiscale
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Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.2002.1524
Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2002.1524
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Other versions of this item:
- Bazart, C., 2001. "Les comportements de fraude fiscale : le face-à-face contribuables - administration fiscale," Cahiers du CREDEN (CREDEN Working Papers) 01.06.22, CREDEN (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit de l'Energie), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Bazart, C. & Bonein, A., 2014.
"Reciprocal relationships in tax compliance decisions,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 83-102.
- Cécile Bazart & Aurélie Bonein, 2012. "Reciprocal Relationships in Tax Compliance Decisions," Working Papers 12-35, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2012.
- Cécile Bazart & Aurélie Bonein, 2014. "Reciprocal relationships in tax compliance decisions," Post-Print halshs-00867505, HAL.
- Cécile Bazart & Aurélie Bonein, 2012. "Reciprocal Relationships in Tax Compliance Decisions," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201239, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Cécile Bazart & Michael Pickhardt, 2011. "Fighting Income Tax Evasion with Positive Rewards," Public Finance Review, , vol. 39(1), pages 124-149, January.
- Cécile Bazart & Michael Pickhardt, 2009. "Fighting Income Tax Evasion with Positive Rewards: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 09-01, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2009.
- Mohamed Ali Bchir & Nicolas Daures & Marc Willinger, 2008.
"Tolérance de la fraude et évasion fiscale : une analyse expérimentale du modèle de Greenberg,"
Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(1), pages 33-46.
- Marc Willinger & Nicolas Daures & Mohamed Ali Bchir, 2008. "Tolérance de la fraude et évasion fiscale : une analyse expérimentale du modèle de Greenberg," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 182(1), pages 33-46.
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