IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/ecoprv/ecop_0249-4744_2008_num_182_1_7750.html

Tolérance de la fraude et évasion fiscale : une analyse expérimentale du modèle de Greenberg

Author

Listed:
  • Marc Willinger
  • Nicolas Daures
  • Mohamed Ali Bchir

Abstract

[fre] Nous présentons dans cet article une évaluation expérimentale d’un mécanisme de prévention de la fraude fiscale proposé par Greenberg (1984 ). L’auteur soutient l’idée de la tolérance d’une partie de fraudeurs dans une population. Pour cela, il conçoit un mécanisme fondé sur une probabilité d’audit conditionnelle du comportement de fraude antérieur des agents. On observe que la répartition des sujets est différente de celle prédite par le modèle. L’écart est dû à l'existence d’une relation croissante entre la décision de fraude et le revenu. Cette relation n’est pas prise en compte par le modèle. Nos résultats suggèrent que le mécanisme de Greenberg est basé sur une hypothèse trop restrictive. [eng] Our article presents an experimental assessment of a tax-evasion prevention mechanism proposed by Greenberg (1984). Greenberg argued that tax evasion cannot totally be eliminated in a population. On the basis of this observation, he developed a mechanism in which the audit probability is determined by agents’ earlier fraud behavior. We observe that the distribution of subjects differs from the model’s prediction. The discrepancy is due to the existence of an increasing relationship between the decision to commit fraud and income – a relationship that the model does not take into account. Our results suggest that Greenberg’s mechanism is based on an over-restrictive hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Willinger & Nicolas Daures & Mohamed Ali Bchir, 2008. "Tolérance de la fraude et évasion fiscale : une analyse expérimentale du modèle de Greenberg," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 182(1), pages 33-46.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2008_num_182_1_7750
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2008.7750
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2008.7750
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/ecop.2008.7750
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/ecop_0249-4744_2008_num_182_1_7750
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/ecop.2008.7750?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cécile Bazart, 2002. "Les comportements de fraude fiscale. Le face à face contribuables — administration fiscale," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(4), pages 171-212.
    2. Robert H. Frank & Thomas Gilovich & Dennis T. Regan, 1993. "Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 159-171, Spring.
    3. Landsberger, Michael & Meilijson, Isaac, 1982. "Incentive generating state dependent penalty system : The case of income tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 333-352, December.
    4. Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H. & Schulze, William D., 1992. "Why do people pay taxes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-38, June.
    5. repec:bla:kyklos:v:48:y:1995:i:1:p:3-18 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Greenberg, Joseph, 1984. "Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-13, February.
    7. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    8. Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-373, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. James Alm, 2019. "What Motivates Tax Compliance?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 353-388, April.
    2. Cécile Bazart, 2002. "Les comportements de fraude fiscale. Le face à face contribuables — administration fiscale," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(4), pages 171-212.
    3. Josef Falkinger & Herbert Walther, 1991. "Rewards Versus Penalties: on a New Policy against Tax Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 19(1), pages 67-79, January.
    4. Kim, Youngse, 2003. "Income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma-based model of tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1591-1616, August.
    5. Günther G. Schulze, 1994. "Misinvoicing Imports: the Interdependence of Tax and Tariff Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 22(3), pages 335-365, July.
    6. Tan, Fangfang & Yim, Andrew, 2014. "Can strategic uncertainty help deter tax evasion? An experiment on auditing rules," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 161-174.
    7. Eduardo Engel & James R. Hines Jr., 1998. "Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics," Documentos de Trabajo 47, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    8. Torgler, Benno, 2003. "To evade taxes or not to evade: that is the question," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 283-302, July.
    9. Torgler, Benno & Schneider, Friedrich & Schaltegger, Christoph A., 2007. "With or Against the People? The Impact of a Bottom-Up Approach on Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6331x6vz, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    10. Adriana AnaMaria Davidescu & Eduard Mihai Manta & Adina Teodora Stoica-Ungureanu & Magdalena Anton (Musat), 2022. "Could Religiosity and Religion Influence the Tax Morale of Individuals? An Empirical Analysis Based on Variable Selection Methods," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(23), pages 1-32, November.
    11. Traxler, Christian, 2010. "Social norms and conditional cooperative taxpayers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 89-103, March.
    12. James Alm & James C. Cox & Vjollca Sadiraj, 2020. "Audit State Dependent Taxpayer Compliance: Theory And Evidence From Colombia," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(2), pages 819-833, April.
    13. Basil Dalamagas, 2011. "A Dynamic Approach to Tax Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 39(2), pages 309-326, March.
    14. Angel Solano García, 2015. "Tax Morale with Partisan Parties," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 213(2), pages 83-108, June.
    15. Cécile Bazart & Michael Pickhardt, 2009. "Fighting Income Tax Evasion with Positive Rewards: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 09-01, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2009.
    16. Joseph G. Eisenhauer, 2006. "The Shadow Price of Morality," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 437-456, Summer.
    17. Loukas Balafoutas & Adrian Beck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2014. "The hidden costs of tax evasion: collaborative tax evasion in markets for expert services," Economics Working Papers ECO2014/01, European University Institute.
    18. Cummings, Ronald G. & Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & McKee, Michael & Torgler, Benno, 2009. "Tax morale affects tax compliance: Evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 447-457, June.
    19. Laura Sour, 2004. "An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity," Economía Mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, CIDE, División de Economía, vol. 0(1), pages 43-61, January-J.
    20. Lin, Shi-Woei, 2010. "Self-reporting mechanism for risk regulation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(5), pages 528-534, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2008_num_182_1_7750. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/ecop .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.