Rewards Versus Penalties: on a New Policy against Tax Evasion
The theoretical analysis of tax evasion has typically concentrated on the role of Abstract penalties and on the probability of being investigated and penalized. This article introduces into the standard model of tax evasion the possibility of pecuniary rewards as an economic incentive for taxpaying. The analysis shows that introducing a reward for payment of taxes leads to a welfare improvement over non-prohibitive penalty regimes. An optimal penalty-reward mix is derived that guarantees a certain tax yield for the government and, at the same time, maximizes the taxpayer's utility.
Volume (Year): 19 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:19:y:1991:i:1:p:67-79. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SAGE Publications)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.