Multiple Modes of Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence from the TCMP
In general, theoretical and empirical studies of tax compliance conclude that increasing penalties and detection probabilities increase compliance. However, these conclusions are based on relatively simple models with a single mode of tax evasion. In this paper, we examine the theoretical and empirical implications of accounting for multiple modes of tax evasion. We find that an increase in enforcement effort in one mode has an ambiguous effect on compliance in the targeted mode as well as the other mode. In order to gain greater insight into taxpayer behavior, we use the 1985 TCMP to estimate an empirical model with two modes of evasion: income reporting and deductions reporting compliance. We find that taxpayers use alternative modes of evasion as substitutes. In other words, an increase in enforcement effort in a given mode leads to an increase in compliance in the targeted mode and a decrease in compliance in the other mode. We use our empirical estimates of the parameters in the model to conduct several simulations. We find that the net revenue effect of increased enforcement effort is positive.
|Date of creation:||01 Mar 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 404-413-0235|
Web page: http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Friedland, Nehemiah & Maital, Shlomo & Rutenberg, Aryeh, 1978. "A simulation study of income tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 107-116, August.
- Cowell, F A, 1981. "Taxation and Labour Supply with Risky Activities," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 48(192), pages 365-79, November.
- Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-73, August.
- Pencavel, John H., 1979. "A note on income tax evasion, labor supply, and nonlinear tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 115-124, August.
- Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996.
9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1993.
"Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game,"
Carleton Economic Papers
93-06, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 1994.
- Alm, James & Bahl, Roy & Murray, Matthew N., 1993. "Audit selection and income tax underreporting in the tax compliance game," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-33, October.
- Dubin, Jeffrey A. & Wilde, Louis L., 1988. "An Empirical Analysis of Federal Income Tax Auditing and Compliance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 41(1), pages 61-74, March.
- Erard, Brian, 1997. "Self-selection with measurement errors A microeconometric analysis of the decision to seek tax assistance and its implications for tax compliance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 319-356, December.
- Sanchez, Isabel & Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 345-369, March.
- Kolm, Serge-Christophe, 1973. "A note on optimum tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 265-270, July.
- Christiansen, Vidar, 1980. "Two Comments on Tax Evasion," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 389-93, June.
- Baldry, Jonathan C, 1987. "Income Tax Evasion and the Tax Schedule: Some Experimental Results," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 42(3), pages 357-83.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
- Christiansen, Vidar, 1980. "Two comments on tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 389-393, June.
- Klepper, Steven & Nagin, Daniel, 1989. "The Anatomy of Tax Evasion," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1-24, Spring.
- Joulfaian, David & Rider, Mark, 1996. "Tax Evasion in the Presence of Negative Income Tax Rates," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 49(4), pages 553-70, December.
- Cowell, Frank A., 1985. "Tax evasion with labour income," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 19-34, February.
- Jonathan S. Feinstein, 1991. "An Econometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion and its Detection," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 14-35, Spring.
- Robben, Henry S. J. & Webley, Paul & Weigel, Russell H. & Warneryd, Karl-Erik & Kinsey, Karyl A. & Hessing, Dick J. & Martin, Francisco Alvira & Elffers, Henk & Wahlund, Richard & Van Langenhove, Luk, 1990. "Decision frame and opportunity as determinants of tax cheating : An international experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 341-364, September.
- Alm, James & Bahl, Roy & Murray, Matthew N, 1990. "Tax Structure and Tax Compliance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 72(4), pages 603-13, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0306. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paul Benson)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.