Auditing with Signals
This paper is a first step in the analysis of the use of signals of taxpayer's incomes by tax audit authorities. In a very simple model, we consider the design of the audit strategy when the tax authority can commit to it and has free access to a signal correlated with the taxpayer's true income. We discuss the optimal enforcement policy and compare it with the optimal one when only self-reported income is considered. Our main result is that the well-known regressive bias of revenue-maximizing audit rules may be convert in a progressive one when signals are used.
|Date of creation:||01 Aug 2000|
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